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at Law, at trial.

-n-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW

ii

CONTENTS OF ADDENDA

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

vi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

13

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE A WEAPON WAS USED IN
CONNECTION WITH A STALKING

13

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN IMPROPER
JURY INSTRUCTION AS TO THE DEFINITION OF "USE OF A
WEAPON" OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION

18

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STALKING STATUTE

19

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

28

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

28

-iii-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

29

-iv-

CONTENTS OF ADDENDA

I. JUDGMENT
II. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
III. NOTICE OF APPEAL
IV. MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
V. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

-v-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
CASES CITED:
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)
Buschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046 (Nev. 1990)
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991)
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)
NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
People v. Chambers, 498 P.2d 1024 (Ca. 1972)
Peterson v. State, 930 P.2d 414 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996)
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987)
State v. Lee, 957 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1998)
State v. Petrak, 8 P.3d 1174 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999)
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503
State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993)
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993)
United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 502 U.S. 884, 112 S. Ct. 237 (1991)
United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1999)
United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
United States v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1999)
Zissi v. State Tax Comm., 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992)
-vi-

15,16,17,18,19
16
22
21
27
22,23,24
22,23
21
22
14
26
21
3,19,24,25,27,28
2,13
23
25
16
25
2,18
2,18
14
14
26
16
16
16
22,23

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

3
3,21
3,21

UTAH CONSTITUTION:
Article 1, section 1 of the Utah Constitution

3, 25

UNITED STATES CODE:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

15

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
§ 76-5-106.5(2)
§ 78-2a-3

1, 3, 13, 17, 20
1

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 2.3, at 128-32 (1986)
Webster's New Intern'l. Diet. (3d ed. 1961)

-vii-

22
14

RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH #7963
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]
>
. ]I

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
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I
]

Case No. 20001056-CA
Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of Andrew Weisberg
("Appellant") for Stalking, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-106.5(2) (2000). See Addendum I.
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving
a second degree felony, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to arrest judgment based upon
insufficient evidence to demonstrate a weapon was used in connection with a stalking?
"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of an arrest ofjudgment, we
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict. We will sustain the trial court's decision unless the
jury verdict is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that
all reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994
P.2d 177 (citations omitted).
2. Did the trial court err in giving an improper jury instruction as to the definition of
"use of a weapon" over Appellant's objection?
"An assertion on appeal that a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law presents a
question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 989-90
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), cited in State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503.
3. Did the trial court err in not granting Appellant's motion to dismiss based upon the
unconstitutionality of the stalking statute?

The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred
to in Appellant's Brief and our reproduced at Addendum II: First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Utah Constitution, article I, section 1; Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-106.5(2).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
An Amended Information filed on or about April 20,2000, charged Appellant

with Stalking, a second degree felony (R. 001).

B.

Course of Proceedings
Appellant proceeded to trial by jury before the Honorable Pamela G.

Heffernan, on October 25, 2000 (R. 119-122).
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C.

Disposition in Trial Court
Appellant was found guilty of stalking on October 26, 2000. (R. 125)1.

Appellant was sentenced on November 30, 2000, to one to fifteen years in prison (R. 25556). A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 28, 2000 (R. 253). See Addendum
III.

D.

Statement of the Facts

\

The charges in the instant case arose based upon allegations that Appellant
began stalking Robin Archibald as a result of a business deal gone bad. Wayne Ogden was
a client of Avis and Archibald, a title company in which Robin Archibald was a partner
(R.261, p. 30). During the course of Wayne Ogden's involvement with Avis and Archibald,
Appellant was with Wayne Ogden at a meeting at Avis and Archibald sometime in April or
May of 1997. Id. As a result of Appellant investing with Wayne Ogden and his use of Avis
and Archibald, Appellant lost a substantial amount of money (R.261, p.31). Appellant sued
Avis and Archibald for his claimed loss of $ 115,000 (R.261, p.20). Appellant believed that
Avis and Archibald owed him $26,000 (R.261, p.31). After several meetings that Archibald
had with Wayne Ogden, one of the last meetings involved Appellant. Id. At this meeting
1

Counsel on appeal did not represent Appellant during the proceedings held in the
trial court.
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both Wayne Ogden and Appellant had displayed a small shotgun, which Archibald was led
to believe belonged to Ogden. The reason for the weapon was that Ogden and Appellant
brought a substantial amount of cash to the meeting. This display of the gun was not done
in any type of threatening manner (R.261, p.33). Archibald was nervous, because guns can
discharge, but she was not fearful of anything (R.261, p.33). Ogden and Appellant had
brought a substantial amount of money into Avis and Archibald, which needed to be
counted, and Archibald assumed that was why they had the weapon with them (R.261, p.33).
Archibald did not want to take responsibility for that amount of money, so Ogden and
Appellant took the money back and later brought a cashier's check to Archibald (R.261,
p.34). In August, 1997, Appellant filed suit against Avis and Archibald when his investment
went south and his money was gone (R.261, p.35). At some point following the filing of the
suit, Appellant came into Avis and Archibald's office asking for his money. Id. These were
the only two occasions that Appellant had ever come into the business (R.261, p.92).
On August 11,1997, Archibald received a fax which read: "liar, liar" and bore
an imprint of C & A Properties across it. Archibald stated that C & A Properties was a
business in which Appellant was a principle (R.261, p.36). Appellant was seen driving by
the Avis and Archibald business several times, which is located in a business center/strip
mall area in Odgen, Utah. (R.261, p.37-38). There was only one entrance into the parking
-5-

area where these businesses were located (R.261, p.95). Archibald also received a voice mail
message at work from someone who disguised their voice stating, "Robin, you better back
off or you're going to find you cold, dead body in a field somewhere." (R.261, p.38).
Archibald did not recognize the voice. Id. Archibald began seeing Appellant drive near or
past her business all the time (R.261, p. 39).
On October 14,1997, while Archibald was at work late, she heard a loud noise
outside which caught her attention. She noticed Appellant's truck parked outside the
business and that he was inside staring at her. (R.261, p.40). Archibald called the police, and
was told to get a license plate number. She was able to retrieve the license, but the vehicle
left before the police arrived (R.261, p.42-43). Archibald believed that Appellant was there
four to five minutes (R.261, p.43). She was very nervous (R.261, p.44). Over the next six
months, Appellant would drive by the business an average of once a week. Id. Archibald
was aware, however, that Appellant did business with other businesses in the area and would
see him go into other businesses on numerous occasions.(R.261 p.48-49)
On April 6,1998, there was an incident at a Wingers restaurant. Archibald and
her assistant, Cassandra Hall, were driving to Wingers for lunch and saw Appellant in the
parking lot (R.261, p.51). Archibald decided not to eat at Wingers and left, but then came
back a few minutes later believing Appellant had left. Id. When Archibald pulled back into
-6-

the parking lot of Wingers, Appellant was still there in his vehicle and was on his cell phone
(R.261, p.52). As Archibald and Hall walked into the restaurant, Appellant appeared near
the entrance, which startled her (R.261, p.53). Archibald stated that Appellant had on a coat
and reached into his lapel and pulled out his cell phone-like a move someone would do for
a gun-but she could see it was a phone. Id. Archibald and Hall walked through the doors
of the restaurant, and Appellant followed behind and slapped his hand loudly on the door
(R.261, p.54). There was no discussion or conversation with Appellant. Id. Archibald and
Hall were seated in a booth and Appellant turned and went the opposite direction into the
restroom (R.261, p.55). Appellant came out of the bathroom and mumbled something to
Archibald as he passed, but she could only understand him saying something about, "black."
Id. Seated a couple of booths behind Archibald was Dennis Porter and other business
acquaintances that she knew. Hall observed Appellant sit down with Porter at his table
(R.261, p.56). A few minutes later, Appellant was leaving and according to Archibald, he
flipped her off as he passed. Id. Porter then came up to Archibald and asked her what she
did to get Appellant so mad, and he related other statements Appellant had made about her,
which scared her. (R.261, p.57).
Another instance in October 1998, was related to Archibald by Hall, who
informed her that Appellant had stopped her in the parking lot outside the business and
-7-

asked Hall why she worked for a bunch of thieves (R.261, p.58). Archibald continued to see
Appellant all the time driving by her business.
In June of 1999, Archibald was driving from Morgan to Ogden and saw
Appellant in a different vehicle driving next to her, staring at her for about one block
(R.261, p.59-60). Appellant did not follow her, but she saw him again as she got closer to
an intersection near her business (R.261, p.62). Archibald went around by an Alberton' s and
saw Appellant parked in his vehicle as if he was waiting for her (R.261, p.63-64). Archibald
called the police and waited for them to arrive (R.261, p. 64). The police detained Appellant
at that time, and Archibald returned to work (R.261, p.65). Officer Chet Bingham was able
to confirm that Appellant was returning from Layton to drop of a co-worker on this occasion
(R.262, p. 174). Archibald saw Appellant again in the parking lot of her business later that
day (R.261, p.65).
Archibald continued to see Appellant around her business less frequently,
maybe two or three times a month (R.261, p.66). In August 1999, there was an agreement
between Appellant and the police that he would not have any contact with Archibald and not
be in the parking lot (R.261, p.66-67). However, the day after the verbal agreement was in
place, Appellant was in the parking lot of the business (R.261, p.68). Appellant continued
to be in the parking lot after August, going into other businesses, or sometimes just his

vehicle would be in the parking lot (R.261, p.68). Archibald noticed his picket sign laid
across his vehicle (R.261, p.69). Archibald indicated that the picketing did not bother her
or prompt her to call police, and that Appellant's picketing continued throughout October
and November of 1999 (R.261, p.71). Archibald also received several hang up calls and
messages at her office, from an unknown source, saying, "You better back off or your dead."
(R.261, p.72).
On December 23, 1999, everything came to a stop when Appellant was seen
outside the business again, and employees observed him parked outside. Someone inside the
business screamed that he had a gun. (R.261, p. 76). Melissa Bear, an employee at the time,
saw Appellant walk from the driver's side to the passenger's side of the vehicle, take a gun
out of the passenger's side and place it in his trunk (R.261, p. 132). The gun was never
pointed at anyone (R.261, p. 133). Another employee, Stephanie Ware, corroborated Bear's
account involving the gun, and that Appellant had popped the trunk of his car, walked to
passenger's side, retrieved a gun (holding it with the barrel down), placed it in the trunk and
drove away (R.262, p. 161).Archibald never saw Appellant or the gun on this occasion, but
was present in her office and called the police. (R.261, p. 133). Appellant left before the
police responded, but Appellant came back to the area later that day (R.261, p. 81). Archibald
never saw a gun, but understood that there was one in the trunk of Appellant's car. Id. At
-9-

I

this same time, Officer Dwight Ruth ("Ruth") was across the street from the business doing
reports, when he noticed Appellant in the parking lot (R. 262, p.204). Ruth noticed
Appellant go into the dry cleaning business nearby, but had nothing with him (R.262,
p.205). Ruth observed Appellant return and take something from his car and put it in his

i

trunk, but could not see what it was (R.262, p.207). Ruth received a dispatch a few second
later and stopped Appellant's vehicle. Id.
When Appellant returned to the business later that day with his picket sign, he
was arrested (R.261, p.83). All instances of driving past or parking at the business ceased
i

from that point on (R.261, p.76). Archibald described the effect that Appellant had on her
- from contributing to her separation from her husband, to a fear of not going anywhere
alone (R.261, p.72-73).

<

Randall Layton testified that he occasionally did business with Avis and
Archibald and saw Appellant outside one day in his vehicle (R.262, p. 143-44). Appellant
told him not to do business with Avis and Archibald. Id. Layton indicated that there was
nothing out of the ordinary about his contact with Appellant (R.262, p. 147). Over
Appellant's objection, Layton testified that he spoke with Appellant approximately two and
one-half weeks before trial and attempted to ask Appellant about the day he saw him at Avis
•

•

-

>
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•

•

•

i

and Archibald. Appellant told Layton he should mind his "fucking business" and that he was
going to "kick his butt." (R.262, p. 145-50).
After the State rested, Appellant moved to dismiss the charge based upon the
unconstitutionality of the statute, which was denied (R.262, p.218, 235). Appellant also
moved for a reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor, arguing that there was no "use" of
a firearm, which motion was also denied (R.262, p.235, 241). Appellant also lodged an
objection to Instruction No. 34, which defined "use of a dangerous weapon." (R.262, p.318).
Instruction 34 stated:
Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into
service or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited to
the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such a
manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person.
(R.163). The trial court ruled against Appellant. The jury found Appellant guilty of second
degree felony stalking. (R.262, p.318).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant argues that his conviction for stalking as a second degree felony is
erroneous because he did not "use" a firearm in connection to a stalking offense. The
evidence presented at trial, in the light most favorable to the State, indicated that Appellant

-11-

was outside Archibald's business in his vehicle. He walked to the passenger's side of the
vehicle, retrieved a gun and placed it in the trunk of the vehicle. At no time did he point the
weapon at anyone, and in fact, had the barrel pointed towards the ground. In addition,
Archibald, the alleged victim, never saw any of this activity. Appellant submits that he did
not actively employ the weapon in connection with any offense, as the statute requires. As
such, the most serious offense for which he could have been convicted was for a Class A
misdemeanor stalking.
In conjunction with the above argument, Appellant submits that the jury
instruction regarding the definition of use of a weapon was improper. In light of United
States Supreme Court precedent and other persuasive case law, the "use" of a weapon
involves some type of active employment. The instruction given to the jury regarding this
definition did not appropriately state that standard, nor make it clear that something more
than possession was required.
Notwithstanding the above, Appellant submits that his conviction should be
reversed altogether, given that the stalking statute is unconstitutional on its face, as well as
applied to him under the particular circumstances of the case. Appellant was involved in
lawful, constitutionally protected activities, such as picketing and frequenting public places,
so that his conviction of stalking for engaging in those activities is unconstitutional.
-12-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
ARREST JUDGMENT BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
DEMONSTRATE A WEAPON WAS USED IN CONNECTION WITH A
STALKING
A.

Standard of Review

"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of an arrest of
judgment, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. We will sustain the trial court's
decision unless the jury verdict is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an
element of the crime that all reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt." State v.
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177 (citations omitted).

D.

Insufficient Evidence that a Weapon was "Used" in Connection with
a Stalking

Appellant was convicted of second degree felony stalking based upon the
allegation that he "used a dangerous weapon... in the commission of the crime of stalking."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(6)(a) (2000). The word "use" means " to carry out a purpose
or action by means of, to make instrumental to an end or process and to apply to advantage."

-13-
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People v. Chambers, 498 P.2d 1024,1027-28 (Ca. 1972)(quoting Webster's New Intern'l.
Diet. (3d ed. 1961)). The only testimony presented at trial to support that allegation, was that
Appellant drove to the alleged victim's business, parked his vehicle outside the business, and
was seen taking a gun out of the passenger's side of his vehicle and placing it in the trunk
of his vehicle. See R. 261, p. 132-33. The gun was never pointed or raised towards anyone.
See R. 261, p. 133. Furthermore, the alleged victim of the stalking never witnessed this event,
nor was she at a location in her office where she could have witnessed this event. R. 261,
p.76-78. This information was merely related to her by other employees of the business. Id.
The standard of review in such a sufficiency argument is that the court will
reverse only if the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985-86 (Utah 1993).
Stated another way, appellate courts will affirm the jury verdict if "there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993).
Appellant submits that the facts elicited at trial on this allegation cannot be
sufficient to support his conviction for second degree felony stalking by "using" a dangerous
weapon in the commission ofthe crime of stalking. The dangerous weapon was never "used,"
-14-

it was merely moved from one location in his vehicle to another location, all while the vehicle
was parked outside the business. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted a similar
issue regarding what constitutes "use" of a firearm in connection with a crime. In Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), the court held that in order to convict a defendant of
using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, the statute requires evidence
sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, and that evidence
of the proximity and accessibility of the firearm to drugs is not alone sufficient to support a
conviction for "use" under the statute. Id. Although the Bailey court dealt with the
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which imposes a prison term for a person who
"during and in relation to a . . . drug trafficking crime... uses or carries a firearm," Appellant
submits that the rationale applies to the instant case. In Bailey, the defendant had a firearm
inside a bag in the trunk of his car, where drugs were also discovered in the passenger
compartment. Id. at 138. The Supreme Court stated that "use" in this context "must connote
more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense." Id. at 143.
In addition, the court added that "the inert presence of a firearm, without more, is not enough
to trigger § 924(c)(1)... [and that] storage of a firearm, without its more active employment,
is not reasonably distinguishable from possession." Id. at 149.

-15-
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In applying the Bailey rationale to the instant case, Appellant submits that his
possession of the firearm in this case was merely akin to storing the firearm in his vehicle,
and that his deliberate effort to not point it toward anyone or make any demonstrative
movement with the firearm did not involve any type of "active employment" to assist in the

(

commission of the offense as required by the statute. At most, Appellant was merely in
possession the firearm, and in no way employed its "use" to assist in the commission of the
(

offense of stalking.
Several other courts have resolved similar cases in this same manner, by
requiring that the "use" of a weapon must be something more active than mere possession.
See United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(holding that where
defendant agreed to receive guns in exchange for drugs, he was not "using" the gun in

<

connection with a drug trafficking crime); United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556 (6th Cir.
1999)(same); United States v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1999)(defendant's conviction
for use of firearm in connection with conspiracy to violate Hobbs Act (robbery) reversed
because defendant merely transported weapon to co-conspirator days before the robbery held there was no active employment of the weapon); Buschauer v. State, 804 P.2d 1046,
1049 (Nev. 1990)(declaring "use" of a weapon in the commission of a crime indicates that
the instrumentality must be used in conscious furtherance of a criminal objective); State v.
-16-

<

Petrak, 8 P.3d 1174,1179-80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)(holding that a nexus must be established
between the crime and the weapon).
Appellant submits that the rationale in Bailey and other cases cited above
applies to the instant case for the proposition that moving a weapon to a different location in
a vehicle parked outside of a business where an alleged stalking victim works, is not active
employment of that weapon in connection with a stalking offense. In addition, there was
never a sufficient nexus established by the evidence between the weapon and the crime of
stalking for which Appellant was convicted. The alleged victim was never present when the
gun was observed, nor did witnesses who observed the gun indicate that it was actively
employed in any manner in an attempt to facilitate a stalking offense. Witnesses described
Appellant as merely removing the gun from the passenger's side of his vehicle, holding it
barrel down, and securing it in the trunk of his vehicle. There was no active employment or
use of the weapon in connection with the stalking offense. Consequently, there was
insufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant the second degree felony conviction.
At most, counsel submits that this Court should amend the conviction to reflect
the appropriate degree of offense, absent the use of a firearm, which would be a Class A
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(4)(2000).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN IMPROPER JURY
INSTRUCTION AS TO THE DEFINITION OF "USE OF A WEAPON"
OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION
A.

Standard of Review

<

"An assertion on appeal that a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law
presents a question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988,
989-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cited in State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 3059 989 P.2d 503.

B.

Improper Statement of the Law

Appellant submits that the jury instruction No. 34, which defined "use of a
dangerous weapon" was improper. Instruction 34 stated:
(

Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into
service or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited to
the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such a
manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person.

(

(R.163). Appellant submits that following the United States Supreme Court decision in
Bailey, supra, the state of the law regarding "use" of a weapon in connection with an offense
was defined as some type of active employment as argued in Point I. The jury instruction
given by the State, and objected to by Appellant's trial counsel, was not an accurate definition
<
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of the current state of the law. As such, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in that
regard. Bailey and the other cases relied upon in Point I, supra, indicate that in order to
satisfy the "use" element in connection with another offense, there must be some type of
active employment. The definition relied upon by the State and the trial court did not clearly
meet that definition. As such, the trial court committed reversible error.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE STALKING STATUTE
A.

Standard of Review

The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).

B.

Unconstitutional on its Face

Appellant submits that the stalking statute is unconstitutional on the basis of
vagueness and over breadth. The stalking statute under which Appellant was convicted reads
as follows:

-19-
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A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of
his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to
himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his
immediate family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to
himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member
of his immediate family.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2000). Several definitions which are relevant to this statute
are defined as follows:
(a) "course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats
or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.
(b) "immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided
in the household within the prior six months.
(c) "repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1) (2000).
1. Vagueness

-20-

The due process clause ofthe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution require that a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." Connally v. General Constr, Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984).
The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between due process and
vagueness as follows:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.2
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague
statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it
"operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'... than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."

2

A statute which is uncertain as to persons who may fall within its scope will also be
found unconstitutionally vague. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
-21-
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Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (citations omitted). See also
i

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357-58 (1983) (citations omitted) ("where the legislature
fails to provide . . . minimal guidelines [to govern law enforcement], a criminal statute may
permit 'a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their

<

personal predilections.'").3 Statutes which are vague have been struck as unconstitutional on
their face. See Kolender, supra. The Supreme Court has invalidated a criminal statute on its
face even when the statute could conceivably have had some valid application. See, e.g.,
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, n. 8. In Zissi v. State
Tax Comm., 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992), the Utah supreme court states:
We will find a statute to be unconstitutionally vague... when it is insufficiently
explicit and clear to inform the reader of common intelligence what conduct
is proscribed . . . . We apply this test in light of the fact that exactitude of
language is seldom possible. Consequently, we will not invalidate a statute for
vagueness if any sensible, practical effect can be given to the contested
statutory terms.

<

(

M a t 854.

1
3

The three standards set forth by the court are independent of each other. Thus, a statute
may offend due process simply by violating one of the three standards. See generally,
LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 2.3, at 128-32 (1986). See also NAACP v.
Burton,31l U.S. 415 (1963).

{
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Thus, a preliminary issue to be determined on appeal is whether the statute
gives a person of ordinary intelligence "a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly," as noted as the first element in Grayned and Zissi. It is clear
that a person of ordinary intelligence most likely cannot determine what would constitute
lawful picketing of a business, from "stalking" someone by engaging in physical proximity
to that person which would cause emotional stress. Therefore, it is almost, if not totally
impossible that such a person can reasonably conduct himself or herself to conform to such
a law. Consequently, the statute on its face is extremely broad and criminalizes potentially
innocent conduct. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Accordingly, it is void for vagueness under
the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, as it fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah
1987); Zissi, 842 P.2d at 854.
The second standard requires that "if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them." This
statute provides no explicit standards to define what is required for stalking. This is
evidenced by Appellant being told by law enforcement officers on various occasions that he
could be outside the business picketing, and on several other occasions, by different law
-23-
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enforcement officers that he could not picket outside the business. It leaves the reasonable
i

person to guess whether that conduct is permissible or not. Such a vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to law enforcement, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory

i

application, without any notice to potential defendants that their conduct may violate such
a statute.

r
1

The third factor set forth in Groyned indicates that where a vague statute "abuts
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise
1

of those freedoms." Consequently, uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "' steer far
wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Because of the

I

uncertain and vague language of the statute, it inhibits Appellant's rights to picket a
business. In order for him to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone," whatever that may be,
may require him to limit his First Amendment freedoms.
Although this court held in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 93 5 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), that this statute was not void for vagueness, Appellant submits that the fact that

1

the Court did not address a situation in Lopez where legitimate, protected, First Amendment
right was at issue, warrants reconsideration of that decision. Lopez did not involve an

(
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individual exercising his right to picket a business or frequent particular businesses in an area
where he may not be wanted. This is not the similar type of "stalking" case which this Court
addressed in Lopez, and consequently, Appellant argues that this Court should reconsider that
case in light of the present circumstances.
2. Overbreadth
Statutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and
innocuous behavior. Stated another way, a statute is overbroad if it attempts to sanction
constitutionally protected activities. Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1263 (citations omitted). Criminal
statutes require particular scrutiny when challenged for overbreadth and may be facially
invalid if they make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, even
if they also have legitimate application. State v. Lee, 957 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1998).
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides for the right of men to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions. Utah Const, art. I, sec. 1. A law is overbroad
under the free speech provision of the State Constitution to the extent that it announces a
prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited. State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379,
382-83 (Or. 1999). As argued above under the vagueness doctrine, this particular statute
reaches non-prohibitive conduct, such as one's right to picket a business, or remain lawfully
in public places. Appellant was merely exercising those rights in the instant case, which
-25-
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should not encompass his conduct as criminal under the stalking statute. The stalking statute
i

should be interpreted as unconstitutionally overbroad because it does sanction
constitutionally protected activities, even though it also has a legitimate application.
A defendant who inadvertently encounters another person in a public place has

1

not "knowingly" approached or appeared within sight of that person within the meaning of
the stalking statute. Peterson v. State, 930 P.2d 414 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996). Appellant was
convicted based upon his numerous "sightings" near Archibald's business, which is located
in a public business complex. As the Peterson court outlines, merely seeing someone in a
public place where they have every right to be cannot fall within the concept of stalking. As
such, the potential for encompassing legitimate behavior through the stalking statute should
result in its unconstitutionality based upon its far-reaching application to lawful conduct.

C.

<

Unconstitutional as Applied to Appellant

Furthermore, a statute that is not facially unconstitutional may be
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its application. United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d
1397, 1403 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 884,112 S. Ct. 237 (1991). Here, the issue on

,

appeal is that as applied to Appellant, this statute prohibits the lawful exercise of free speech
and his ability to protest or picket a business establishment. According to the language of the
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statute, Appellant had the potential for being charged or not being charged based upon this
type of conduct. There is nothing in the language of the stalking statute that determines when
such conduct will fall outside the parameters of the statute and when it will not.
Differentiating between which conduct is proscribed is at best guesswork, and the statute's
broad language offers no guidance. Therefore, Appellant could not have conducted himself
in such a way as to avoid the sanctions of the statute, which "creates a trap for the wary as
well as the unwary." Gentile v. State Bar ofNevada, 501 U.S. 1030,111 S. Ct. 2720,273132 (1991). As such, Appellant submits that as applied to him in this particular set of
circumstances, the statute is unconstitutional.
Although this Court has previously decided that the stalking statute was not
unconstitutional, in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the
circumstances surrounding Lopez and the instant case are dissimilar when the court analyzes
the unconstitutionality as applied to Appellant. The conduct that Appellant is being
prohibited from through the stalking statute can be innocent and lawful conduct, such as
picketing a business or being free to lawfully remain in a public place or solicit public
businesses. Appellant was convicted not for entering Archibald's business where he was not
wanted, but for being near the business. Appellant had legitimate business with other
establishments in the area and had every right to be in a public place where those other
-27-
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I

businesses were located. The fact that his other interests and legitimate business was
1
conducted near Archibald's business was irrelevant. Thus, Appellant's conduct here is not
the type of conduct that this Court analyzed in Lopez, and should be treated differently.
In Lopez, the defendant was romantically attracted to the victim, whom he

<

called repeatedly, made personal, face-to-face contact with, and confronted at various school
functions. Appellant only had personal contact one time in Archibald's office where he
demanded money. Every other incident merely involved "sightings" ofAppellant, which may
be considered bothersome or annoying, but do not necessarily fall under the stalking statute
i
as criminal behavior. Consequently, the stalking statute as applied to Appellant in this
particular circumstance is unconstitutional.
i
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse
his conviction, or at a minimum reduce his conviction as demanded herein.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
I
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter.

I
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 2001.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
RONALD J. YENGICH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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day of August, 2001, to:

ADDENDUM I
JUDGMENT

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
LAW AND MOTION
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991905379 FS

ANDREW WEISBERG,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
November 28, 2 000

PRESENT
Clerk:
juanas
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARDS, RANDALL W.
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 28, 1955
Video
Tape Number:
HI128
Tape Count: 22 5
CHARGES
1. STALKING (amended)
Plea: Not Guilty

2nd Degree Felony
• Disposition: 10/26/2000 Guilty

HEARING
Court hears arguments as to Motion to Arrest.
Court denies motion.
Court hears from counsel and victim as to sentencing. Defendant
declines to make a statement. Defendant is sentenced.
Defense files a Certificate of Probable Cause and Notice of
Appeal. State submits certificate. Court denies motion. A record
has been made by the court.
Court orders cash bail exhonerated to the defendant.

.OKK

i

Case No: 991905379
Date:
Nov 28, 2 000
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of STALKING a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Credit is granted for time served.
Dated this

_

day of

N O V ^ 2000 , Jfl=
PAMELA/G. HEFFERNAN
District Court Judge

•n-^^,^

o

/ 1 -. « + - \
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ADDENDUM II

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES
& RULES

Amend. XIII, § 1

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT XIII
Section
!
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]

.

Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5,. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive arid Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
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and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVTI
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 1.]
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]
Section 1. [National prohibition .— Intoxicating liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amend. XII

AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIII

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble^ arid to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.

..•.'/•

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to.
the States respectively, or to the people. AMENDMENTXI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.]
^he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the.tJnited States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
\V.'..-. .-.
AMENDMENTV
,•'-• themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning— Due pro- Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of #11 persons voted for as
cess of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, the Government of the United States, directed to the Presior in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 'same presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
offehce to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, such majority, then from.the persons having the highest
without just compensation.
'
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediy
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
'.;;..
AMENDMENTV! '..7\,."•"'
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
[Rights of accused.]
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall "enjoy, the consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
right to a speedy and public trial, by aft impartial jury of the and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit- And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The
v
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
AMENDMENT VII
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the office of President shall be eligible to that of VicePresident of the United States.
to the rules of the common law.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
'-'V: Distribution of Powers
-VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
.. IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
'••'"'•" X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
.
'",:. XI. Local Governments [Proposed!
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
. V,XV Militia
XVL Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
** XXI. Salaries
; XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this* CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or
hold office.]
[Religious liberty] [Proposed.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process, of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
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13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
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15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
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17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
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24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
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27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]
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Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.
i896
Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r inherent in t h e people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to; alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require. •
1896

Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
The State of Utah is a n inseparable part ,of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the. land.
1896
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — N o property qualification
to v o t e or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the Stfkte or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. T h e r e shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
[1999]
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] - .•,
.'/.--.•«#
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
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(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense.
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of
the sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds
that the interests of justice would be best served and makes
specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the
record.
i?98

(3) For the purpose of this section, "serving a sentence"
means sentenced and committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections,, the sentence has not been terminated or
voided, and the prisoner is:
(a) not on parole; or
, (b). in custody after arrest for a parole violation.
1997

76-5-102.5. A s s a u l t b y p r i s o n e r .
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1974

76-5-104. Consensual altercation.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel,
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged in
an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9.-705.

76-5-102.6. A s s a u l t o n a c o r r e c t i o n a l officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1994

i

I

76-5-106.5

76-5-102.7. Assault against health care provider and
emergency medical service worker — Penalty.
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or emergency medical service worker is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if: .
(a) the person knew that the. victim was a health care
provider or emergency medical service worker; and
(b) the health care provider or emergency medical
service worker was performing.emergency or life saving
duties within the scope of his authority at the time of the
assault.
. . .
(2) As used in this section:
.
(a) "Emergency medical service worker" means a person certified under Section 26-8a-302.
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided
in Section 78-14-3.
1999

1997

76-5-105. Mayhem.
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables or
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puts
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
1973
76-5-106. H a r a s s m e n t .
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written or
recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
1995

76^5-106.5. Definitions —. Stalking — Injunction —
Hearing.
(1) As used in this section: ./,(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining
76-5-102.8. D i s a r m i n g a p e a c e officer.
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by
takes or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows
person.
is a peace officer:
^
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child,
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the. scope of
household or who regularly resided in the household
his authority as a peace officer.
* '
1999
within the prior, six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
76-5-103. A g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t .
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
• (a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to anreasonable person:
other; or
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
his immediate family; or
• Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
, member of his immediate family;
• death or serious bodily injury.
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony.
specific person:
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner.
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital felony
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress;
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated assault
and
is guilty of:
(c) whose conduct:
(a) a felony of the second degree if no'serious bodily
(i) induces fear i n the specific person of bodily
injury was intentionally caused; or
injury to himself or a member of his immediate
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily injury
family; or
was intentionally caused.
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony or a
or a member of his immediate family.
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault is
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or
guilty of:
knowingly violates a stalking injunction, or intentionally or
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
was intentionally caused; or
issued pursuant to this section.
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inten(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor upon the offender's
tionally caused.
.
first violation of Subsection (2).
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) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) h a s been convicted in another jurisdiction of an
offense t h a t is substantially similar to the offense of
stalking;
(c) h a s been previously convicted of any felony offense
in U t a h or of any crime in another jurisdiction which if
committed in U t a h would be a felony, in which the victim
of t h e stalking or a member of the victim's immediate
family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; or
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued p u r s u a n t to Subsection (7).
>) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 or used other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury, in t h e commission of t h e
crime of stalking;
(b) h a s been previously convicted two or more times of
the offense of stalking;
(c) h a s been convicted two or more times in another
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses t h a t are substantially similar to t h e offense of stalking;
(d) h a s been convicted two or more times, in any
combination, of offenses under Subsection (5); or
(e) h a s been previously convicted two or more times of
felony offenses in U t a h or of crimes in another jurisdiction
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be
felonies, in which t h e victim of the stalking was also a
victim of the previous felony offenses.
7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court
1 held in abeyance for a period of time shall operate as an
Dlication for a permanent criminal stalking injunction limlg t h e contact of the defendant and t h e victim.
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be
issued without a hearing unless t h e defendant requests a
hearing a t the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of
plea in abeyance. The court shall give the defendant
. notice of his right to request a hearing.
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be
• -• . held at t h e time of the verdict, finding, or plea of
guilty, guilty a n d mentally ill, plea of no contest, or
acceptance of plea in abeyance unless the victim
requests otherwise, or for good cause.
(ii) If t h e verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty
and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of
plea in abeyance w a s entered in a justice court, a
certified copy of t h e judgment and conviction or a
certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district
court as a n application and request for hearing for a
permanent criminal stalking injunction.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may
grant t h e following relief:
(i) a n order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of t h e victim a n d requiring t h e defendant to
stay away from t h e victim and members of t h e
victim's immediate family or household and to stay
away from any specified place t h a t is named in the
order a n d is frequented regularly by the victim; and
(ii) a n order restraining t h e defendant from making contact with the victim, including an order forbidding t h e defendant from personally or through an
agent initiating any communication likely to cause
annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or
telephone contact with t h e victim, the victim's employers, employees, fellow workers, or others with
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whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to t h e victim.
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be
dissolved upon application of the victim to the court which
granted the order.
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions
issued pursuant to this section shall be sent by the court
to the statewide warrants network or similar system.
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued
pursuant to this section shall be effective statewide.
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this
section shall constitute an offense of stalking. Violations
may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking
victim, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.

• '

.•
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76-5-107. Threat a g a i n s t life o r p r o p e r t y — Penalty.
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he
threatens to commit any offense involving violence with intent
to:
(a) cause action of any n a t u r e by a n official or volunteer
agency organized to deal with emergencies;
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury; or
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or
room; place of assembly; place to which the public has
access; or aircraft, automobile, or other form of transportation.
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt
the occupation of a building, a place to which t h e public has
access, or a facility of public transportation operated by a
common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony.
1988
76-5-107.5. P r o h i b i t i o n of "hazing" — Definitions —
Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of hazing if t h a t person intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly commits a n act or causes another to
commit an act that:
(a) (i) endangers the mental or physical health or
safety of another; or
(ii) involves any brutality of a physical nature such
as whipping, beating, branding, calisthenics, bruising, electric shocking, placing of a harmful substance
• on the body, or exposure to the elements; or
(iii) involves consumption of any food, liquor, drug,
or other substance or any other physical activity that
endangers the mental or physical health and safety of
an individual; or
(iv) involves any activity t h a t would subject the
individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep
deprivation, extended isolation from social contact, or
conduct t h a t subjects another to extreme embarrassment, shame, or humiliation; or
(v) involves cruelty to any animal as provided in
Section 76-9-301; and
(b) (i) is for t h e purpose of initiation, admission into,
affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition for
continued membership i n any organization; or
(ii) if the actor knew t h a t the victim is a member of
or candidate for membership with a school team or
school organization to which t h e actor belongs or did
belong within t h e preceding two* years.
(2) It is not a defense to prosecution of hazing t h a t a person
under 21, against whom the hazing was directed, consented to
or acquiesced in the hazing activity.
(3) An actor who hazes another is guilty of a:
(a) class C misdemeanor if the conduct violates Section
76-9-301;
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ADDENDUM III
NOTICE OF APPEAL

RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
NQV2 9 2G03
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191
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IN THE SECOND IUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

) NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANDREW WEISBERG,
Defendant.

) Case No. 991905379

COMES NOW the above named Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney,
Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal the Judgment and
Conviction that was rendered hereon in the above entitled case on or about the 26th day of
October, 2000, to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this 28th day of November, 2000.

W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice
of Appeal to counsel for the Plaintiff:
WTeber County Attorney
2380 Washington Boulevard, Second Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
^ ^
postage prepaid, on
day of MSVember, 2000

ttaxixrtv^&p^-fo
Secretary

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, Fran Lund, certify that on the 1st day of December, 2000 that I sent a
certified copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL to the UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS.

^M^U^U^J^
Fran Lund, Clerk

ADDENDUM IV

MOTION TO ARREST
JUDGMENT

RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
) MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.
ANDREW WEISBURG,
Defendant.

)

) Case No. 991905379

COMES NOW the Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Randall
W. Richards, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure hereby files
this Motion to Arrest Judgment. This Motion is based upon and supported by a
Memorandum to be submitted shortly.
DATED this

day of November, 2000.

§
<
/>
r

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed/faxed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Motion to;
Camille Neider
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
/
postage prepaid, on this I V day of November^OOO.
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ADDENDUM V

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO
ARREST JUDGMENT

RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
)
)

NOV 0 9 2000

ANDREW WEISBURG,
Defendant.

) Case No. 991905379

COMES NOW the Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Randall
W. Richards, and hereby files this Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. During the spring of 1997, the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, entered into a financial
transaction with Wayne Ogden, with Robin Archibald and the company Avis and Archibald
allegedly acting as an escrow agent, and as the title company.
2. During this time the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, allegedly delivered to Robin Archibald
and the company Avis and Archibald a total of $115,000 in cash and checks.
3. Andrew Weisberg never saw these funds again.
o
o

4. On or about July 31st 1997, the Defendant, Andrew Weisberg, filed a civil complaint against
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Robin Archibald and Avis and Archibald requesting judgment on the above monies.
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5. Robin Archibald testified that during the month of August 1997, she began to receive
unwanted contact by the Defendant which included a fax, an alleged phone call stating

)

"Robin you keep fucking around and your cold dead body is going to end up in a field
somewhere.", as well as numerous appearances in the strip mall parking lot.
6. On or about Nov. 14th the victim of the criminal case, Robin Archibald, filed a civil
complaint in the Second Judicial District Court in which she alleged stalking type activity,
and received a temporary restraining order restraining Andrew Weisberg from coming
within 1000 feet of Archibald.
7. The restraining order and the complaint were both dismissed with prejudice, upon the
merits, by stipulation (see exhibit A)of both parties on or about the 3rd day of April 1998.
(see attached exhibit B)
8. The Defendant -thereafter continued driving into the parking lot, contacting various
customers, and picketing the business.
9. On or about 27th day of September 1999, the Defendant entered into a diversion agreement
with the South Ogden Justice Court, wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed not to
initiate any contact with each other, families, friends, associates, or co-workers.(see attached
exhibit C).
10. Thereafter, the Defendant continued going to the parking lot, as well as picketing the
business.
11. On or about Dec. 24th 1999, the defendant was charged with stalking.
ARGUMENT
The Defendants conviction should be arrested on the grounds that the
statute under which he was prosecuted is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad under the 14th and 1st Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides due process
guarantees to all citizens of the country, and further applies the protections to state actions. The
U.S. Supreme Court the case of Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) held "As

)

generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement". The Court went on to state: "where the Legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines [to govern law-enforcement], a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep
that allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."' (Id. At
358). In the Kolender decision, the appellee, Edward Lawson, was detained and arrested on
approximately fifteen (15) occasions between March 1975 and January 1977, under a statute
requiring a person who loiters on the streets to provide identification of himself and to account
for his presence when requested by the police officer to do so. The Court had significant
problems with the statute under which Mr. Lawson was arrested, on the basis that the officer
could arbitrarily harass an individual. 1 Based upon these problems, the Court declared the
statute unconstitutionally vague.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has also grappled with similarly
unconstitutional statutes. In the case of State vs. Bradshaw 541 P2d 800 (Utah 1975), the Court
declared the Interfering With Arrest statute unconstitutionally vague. In that case the court held
"if the intention of the Legislature was to penalize a law-abiding citizen by incarceration
because he did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a statute authorizing the same is in
violation of both the Utah and United States Constitutions". Further, in the case of Elks Lodges
#719 & #2021 vs. Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control 905 P.2dll89, 1202, (Utah 1995)
the court held "An enactment will be held unconstitutionally vague only if the terms of the law
1 The Court in Kolender vs. Lawson stated: "our concern here is based upon the potential for arbitrarily
suppressing First Amendment liberties", (id at 358) and, "section 647 (e) furnishes a convenient tool for harsh
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure" (id at 358) and, "[it] confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons
with a violation", (id at 358).

are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts
conform to the law". Finally, the court in the case of State vs. Krueger 975 P.2d 489, 495, (Utah
App. 1999) held: "a vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police officers,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory application".
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the constitutionality of the stalking statute in
the case of Salt Lake City vs. Lopez 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997). However, the court only
addressed a limited vagueness claim raised by the defendant, that of failing to define emotional
distress. In Salt Lake City vs. Lopez the court defined the standard to be used in a vagueness
challenge as follows: "the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define
an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement",
(id at 1265)
In the present case, the stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad both
facially and as applied to this Defendant's conduct. The statute is unclear as to what conduct
is prohibited, in that it impermissibly prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.

An

individual who exercises his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression by picketing a
business establishment that he believes conducts questionable business clearly falls within the
parameters defined by §76 - 5 - 106.5. This individual repeatedly engages in a visual or
physical proximity to a person, causes that person to suffer emotional distress, and has
o

reasonable belief that the person will suffer emotional distress. The very purpose for picketing
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is to in fact be in a physical or visual proximity to a person or business and to cause emotional
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distress by the picketing. The statute is therefore facially unconstitutional due to vagueness.

o>

Furthermore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant Andrew

)

Weisberg.

I

In the present case, the defendant was arrested or harassed by the police for

picketing Avis and Archibald both in the parking lot and on the road. In fact, his picket sign
was seized on one occasion.
On or about Nov. 14th the victim of the criminal case, Robin Archibald, filed a civil
complaint in the Second Judicial District Court in which she alleged stalking type activity, and
received a temporary restraining order restraining Andrew Weisberg from coming within 1000
feet of Archibald. The restraining order and the complaint were both dismissed with prejudice,
upon the merits, by stipulation of both parties on or about the 3rd day of April 1998.
On or about 27th day of September 1999, the Defendant entered into a diversion
agreement with the South Ogden Justice Court, wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed
not to initiate any contact with each other, families, friends, associates, or co-workers. The
Defendant continued to go to the parking lot, and continued picketing, and was allowed to do
so at certain occasions by certain police officers, and was told to discontinue on other occasions
by other police officers.
Over the course of a two-year period, the Defendant was both prohibited and allowed
certain conduct in the parking lot at the Avis and Archibald strip mall. The Defendant was
restrained by a court order, and then shortly thereafter, allowed, by the dismissal with prejudice,
to continue in the conduct. The law-enforcement likewise arbitrarily allowed and prohibited
the Defendants' conduct with no logical explanation or articulable definition as to why and
when his conduct was prohibited. The South Ogden Justice Court likewise issued an order
CM
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wherein both Weisberg and Archibald agreed not to initiate any contact with each other,
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families, friends, associates, or co-workers. Thereafter that order was arbitrarily and
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discriminatorily applied. On certain days Weisberg was allowed to be present in the parking
lot, yet on others he was ordered to leave. On one occasion, as he was driving out of the narking

)
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lot, yet on others he was ordered to leave. On one occasion, as he was driving out of the parldng
lot, and stopped at the stop sign, Archibald pulled alongside, rolled down her window, and
attempted to initiate contact. Weisberg simply drove off. Weisberg was stopped for this contact,
yet Archibald never received so much as a warning.
The Defendant's conduct was therefore "arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced",
which enforcement is prohibited under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
arrest the judgment Of conviction in this case, and dismiss theuefewrges against tfee-fi^fendant.
DATED this

%

day of November, 2000.

)ALL W. RICH;
l^torney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/FACSIMILE
I hereby certify that I mailed/faxed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Memorandum to:
Camille Neider
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor
Ogden,UT 84401
Fax (801) 399-8307
postage prepaid, on this

l_ day of November, 2000.

MlW^f
Secretary
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David R. Hamilton (1318)
Gary R. Williams (7019)
SMITH KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C
Attorneys for Defendant
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone; (801) 476-0303
Facsimile: (801)476-0399
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
ROBIN ARCHIBALD,
Plaintiff,

]1
1
;1
I

vs.

;

ANDREW WEISBERG,

]i
>

STIPULATION AND MOTION TO
DISSOLVE ORDER FOR EX-PARTE
RESTRAINING ORDER AND TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
Civil No; 970908010CV
Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendant.

STIPULATION AND MOTION
Plaintiff and Defendant, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate, agree
and move as follows:
1.

The Order for Ex-parte Restraining Order entered by Judge West on December

26, 1997, shall be dissolved.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint in this action as against Defendant may be dismissed, with

prejudice, and upon its merits,
3.

Each Party shall bear their own costs, expenses, and attorney's fees with respect

u

to the claims that are dismissed in accordance with the foregoing Stipulation,
4,

The Parties jointly move the Court to enter the attached Order in conformity with

the terms of this Stipulation.
DATED this

day of February, 1998.

Geoffrey L, Clark
Attorney for Plaintiff

SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C.
by:

David R. Hamilton
Gary R. Williams
Attorneys for Defendant
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David R. Hamilton (1318)
Gary R. Williams (7019)
SMITH KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone; (801) 476-0303
Facsimile: (801)476-0399

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

ROBIN ARCHIBALD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO DISSOLVE EX-PARTE
RESTRAINING ORDER AND TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
ANDREW WEISBERG,

Civil No; 970905010CV
Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendant.

Based upon the foregoing Stipulation and Motion, the Court being fully advised in the
premises and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Order for Ex-Part e Restraining Order entered by Judge West on

December 26, 1997 in this matter is hereby dissolved.
2.

Plaintiffs Complaint in this action as against Defendant be and the same is hereby

dismissed, with prejudice," and upon its merits.
3.

Each party shall bear their own costs, expenses and attorney's fees with respect to
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the claims that arc dismissed in accordance with this Order, /
MADE AND ENTERED THIS

3

day o ? § W n ^ , 1998,

'$A

Honorable Michael D. Lyon

READ AND APPROVED BY:

As
Geoffrey L. Clark
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON # 1607
Attorney for Defendant
8X8 - 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone (801) 399-9291

I N THE JUSTICE COURT OF SOUTH OGDEN CITY,
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOUTH OGDEN CITY,
DIVERSION AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
:

ANDREW MARK WESBERG,

Case No.

Defendant.

WHEREAS, the above-named defendant, ANDREW M. JVPSBERGL tas been charged with the
crime of Disorderly Conduct, which occurred on or about the^y* day of June 1999, and South Ogden City
having agreed that a diversion agreement would serve the ends of justice in the aisve-matter, the
defendant being a substantial member of his community;
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED, subject to the approval of the Court, and pursuant to the provisions of
Section 77-2-5 e t seq, UCA, 1953, as amended:
1,

Defendant hereby waives his right to a speedy trial.

2,

Defendant shall not initiate any direct or indirect contact with Robin Archibald, her
family, friends, associates and/or co-workers and that Robin Archibald shall not initiate
any direct or indirect contact with the Defendant, his family, friends, associates and/or
co-workers,

*

. In event defendant complies with his agreement, the Court on its own motion on ^O

fcx>» ATi ' n * & ^ — r J &

day of

shall dismiss the information, and the defendant shall not be subject to

further prosecution from the offenses involved, nor any lesser included offense arising out to the same
series of events.

South Ogdtn City V, Weisberg
Diversion Agreement
Page 2 g f 2

In the event of alleged vioiat'cn cf the terms of this agreement an order to show cause shall be
issued and after the hearing, the Court may authorize the prosecuting authority to proceed with
/

prosecution of the aforementioned crime.
DATED this:

day of September 1999.
/

j

^/cA

^-ANDREW MARK WEISBERG
Defendant

&^/tMu*>^
SHAW
Ity Attorney
Approved this ^ 7

5HNELAIR HUTCHISON
^Attorney for Defendant
day of September 1999,

BY THE COURT*

-•fc^V

JUSTtCE C O U R T A G E
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Diversion
Agreement to the following named persons, postage prepaid the
Kenneth D. Eredshaw
South Cgcten City Attorney
3366 West 400 South
West Haven, Utah 34315

day-'^f.September 1599:
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